MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE WORK AND THOUGHT

OF ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

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WRITINGS ON THE EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY, XV

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A.J. Toynbee, *The Slav Peoples*, in «The Political Quarterly», I (1914), 4 [December], pp. 33-68. «With a Map».

NOTE

Toynbee's very first, much neglected assessment of Central Eastern and Eastern Europe's political situation at the breaking of WWI. Notable, among other things, for his largely apologetic and idealizing approach to the imperial dimension of Russian history. Toynbee' attitude, which was obviously motivated by his anxiety to justify Britain's alliance with autocratic Tsardom in a liberal and progressive key, mirrors in an inverted form – in terms of ideological exploitation of Russia's imperial past – its current demonization in the mass media (especially the Italian ones). The main difference is the very lower intellectual level of nowadays "professional" historians turned propagandists.

The Slav Peoples

by Arnold J. Toynbee

During the last generation Germany has been passing through a phase of transition from a thousand years of political torpor to a state of self-conscious and rational political activity; but in this fleeting moment between sleeping and walking she has been visited by a terrible nightmare, which has obsessed her senses and distorted her reviving movements. This bogy of darkness is the Slav, and whichever way she turns her troubled face, she encounters it there confronting her and blocking her path, with the sinister inertness of the "Boyg" when it baffled Peer Gynt on the perilous mountain-side. Immediately beyond her eastern frontier the immense body of Russia sprawls across the spaces of Asia to the Pacific. A century ago Germany resolutely secured herself a strategically defensible line in this quarter, against the day when the monster's limbs should begin to stir; but when she had cleared the ground and built her rampart, she found that she had hacked off in the process certain Polish tentacles instinct with a vitality of their own, which continued to writhe and multiply within her own threshold. Seized with horror, she tried to stamp them to death, and plant her own offspring on this marginal zone; but the vermin refused to be extirpated: instead, they began to multiply more than ever, and to gain ground against her own children, little offshoots of them appearing like plague-spots in Westphalia and the Rhineland, the soils that nourished the purest German stock, and that had become the centres of the growing national industry. This was the more disquieting inasmuch as an indomitable member of the brood had always maintained itself in its lair behind the mountain-ramparts of Bohemia during those auspicious centuries[1] in the Middle Ages when Germany was successful for a time in pushing her advance towards the East; and this creature of the wilderness was growing lustier than ever now that Bohemia had transformed itself into the industrial core of all Central Europe. Germany, however, had managed to outflank the Tchechs on the south and pushing down the Danube valley, put herself in touch with the Magyars of Hungary, an alien tribe truly, but

[1] About A.D. 900 to 1300.

robbed of terror by their isolation and small numbers, and commended to Germany's sympathy by a common hatred of the Slav. South-eastwards, then, there seemed a chance of blazing an open passage, for beyond the Magyars lay the still more exotic Turks, pathetically eager to meet German advances half way for fear of the ubiquitous Russian dragon, which had already laid their house half in ruins by the lazy stretching of its limbs, while, best of all, it was obvious that the ruin of Turkey could not really be arrested, but that the house must one day fall about its masters' ears, leaving Germany, Turkey's champion in the eleventh hour, in possession of the remains as the Turks' sole executor. Two years ago the edifice collapsed: but what was Germany's shock when she beheld new-born heads of the Slav hydra rearing themselves from amid the debris where she had hoped to clear herself a garden-ground, and appealing to Russia with a provocative hiss to warn off Germany from their congenial rubbish-heap! At this final apparition her nerves gave way, and she struck out at the vipers with all her force, only to see the great dragon of the north-east open its jaws in act to swallow her up. «At this juncture the sleeper awoke!»: unfortunately not. Germany is now in the very agony of her evil dream, desperately battling for her life: we have still to convince her that the unwieldy shapes that jostle her on so many sides bear her no essential hostility, and that she only finds herself at grips with them now, because her own action has translated a dream into the realm of reality.

If we are to give Germany this assurance, we must first satisfy our own minds as to the character of this Slav phenomenon, and begin by posing to ourselves the question, What do we mean by the word Slav? Probably the first image called up in our fancy is a vague physiognomy, a broadness of nose and a flatness of face, with an implication of mental sluggishness behind them: «Slav», we answer, «means a certain racial type, moulded of coarser clay than the Teutonic or Latin stocks». But we give up this explanation as soon as we realize that the half-dozen physical varieties into which the population of Europe can be analyzed are each of them represented in almost every geographical unit or human group, while they are only exceptionally discoverable in an uncompounded state, in a few secluded islands and peninsulas on the periphery of dispersion; and this fact is driven home as soon as we meet individual specimens of Slavdom in the flesh, and find ourselves contrasting the

blonde, broad-skulled Pole with the blonde, long-skulled Great Russian and his broad-skulled but brunette Little-Russian brother, while it will puzzle us to select any single type which we can consider as standard Serb or Bulgar. Nationalities, like schoolboys, devise personal remarks about one another for purposes of abuse: the Bavarian will vent his spleen against the dominant Prussian by professing to discern in a prevailing cast of nose and cheek-bones the witness of the Slavonic alloy in his German metal; but at the same time the Prussian will use the very same indications to prove that «if you scratch the Russian you find the Tatar». "Slav", then, turns out to be no physiological classification, and our next definition will probably be "community of language". In making it, we shall at least have put our finger upon an essential factor, for all instances of Slavs to which we may apply it, will prove capable of being grouped under this principle, as follows:

Slavonic speech (spoken by about 130,000,000 people)



This linguistic genealogy points back to an original unity of Slavdom in the past, when the predecessors of all existing Slavonic groups spoke an identical tongue and formed in some sense a single society, and our own Teutonic analogy makes it obvious that the language has gradually become differentiated by the geographical dispersion of its speakers and their diverse historical experience. While, however, the individualization of the Teutons has now proceeded to an advanced degree, the Slavonic-speakers and their speech are still both in a much earlier phase of development. In comparison with Teutonic or Romance the living Slavonic tongues would all count as dialects of one language rather than separate languages

of the same family; and this philological proximity has maintained a real spiritual tie between the various Slav nationalities: for instance, a race-conscious Slovene, Croat, or Serb, possessed of little indigenous culture at home, but fanatically determined to quaff no knowledge from German fountains, would be debarred by no conscientious scruple from attending the Tchech university at Prag, but would feel, on the contrary, that he was receiving there a thoroughly national education; while in the public sphere of politics we have seen the whole Russian nation stirred to the depths by the impulse to succour the little Slav State of Serbia, which is widely sundered from Russia by geography, and whose historical traditions and current problems are correspondingly distinct from Russia's own. Such facts will make us realize that common Slavdom is a much stronger emotional and intellectual force than common Teutonism, if we remind ourselves that to an Englishman French has been for at least a thousand years the "other language" *par excellence*, and that the kindred "High German" is far less familiar to his lips than this quite alien Latin tongue; so that the German accusation that we have sold our Teutonic birthright does not strike any chord in us at all, unless, perhaps, it excites a mild interest in the curious streak of pedantry which colours the German outlook on the world. "Panslavism", then, is clearly in some sense a real bond, forged from the inheritance of the past; but the crucial question is this: Is it, like Teutonism, a mere survival, which has caught our eye in the process of its extinction, or is it a strand round which a mightier bond than ever is in the act of being forged at this moment by the influence of the European National Movement? The latter belief is the Germans' nightmare, and there is much plausibility in the idea. If all Slavonic tongues are still dialects of one essentially homogeneous language, it is a natural inference that all the populations speaking them are likely to incorporate themselves during the twentieth century in a single consolidated nation as the Germans and Italians succeeded in doing during the nineteenth; «And then», the German will conclude, «if the virtue of national unity is so strong that it has inspired ourselves, choked though we are by the Slav hydra's coils, and betrayed by the treacherous majority of the Teutonic race, to make this heroic effort to assimilate all Europe to our national culture, who can be so blind as not to foresee that the united Slav nation of the future, which will include a third of all the inhabitants of Europe and will control some of

the strategically and economically most important areas in the world, will in time bend its sluggish strength to the easy emprise of imposing its barbarism upon the rest of Europe?».

This is the German nightmare clothed in argument, and we can only test its logic by examining the facts at closer quarters than we have so far done. Let us, therefore, take several Slavonic groups and survey their respective characteristics, with a view to ascertaining whether the tendency between them of divergence or of coalescence is actually in the ascendant. We will begin our review with Russia, because she is at once the most important and most individualized of all existing Slavonic units.

I. The original focus of the Slavs seems to have been a region in Central Europe, roughly defined by the Carpathian mountains on the west, the Pripet swamps on the north, the course of the river Dniepr on the east, and the Black See steppes on the south: but while the majority of the Slavonic tribes spread from this centre towards the west, and attached themselves to the outskirts of Latin civilization, the Russians advanced across the Dniepr, to build up a new world of their own in the limitless north-eastern spaces of the Eurasian continent. The double activity of creating and diffusing a new civilization constitutes the national history of Russia, from her first emergence a thousand years ago down to the developments of the present moment. We see the national genius at work in the hinterland of Odessa, where it has conjured out of what a century ago were desolate steppes, traversed by a few nomad herdsmen, an expanse of wheatfields providing an enormous annual export, served by a network of railways, and employing a dense agricultural population: we see it in the Caucasus, where Russia has solved the problem of pacifying a once inaccessible mountain country, which we on the north-west frontier of India and the French in the Atlas have so far hesitated to take in hand: or we can look across the Caspian to Central Asia, where Russia is promoting orderly government and economic improvement over a numerous native population in the face of great racial diversity and of a strongly-characterized culture, antipathetic to the Russian, which she found established in possession of the field, and is accomplishing her mission on a scale and with a success comparable to our own work in India. But the most significant line of Russian expansion is the long strip of colonial settlements that crosses the Urals and stretches away due east through Siberia to

the Pacific, giving promise of new Russian commonwealths in the future, with vaster populations and wider ideals than are yet to be found in "Holy Russia" herself. Russia has now claimed most of her inheritance, but she has hardly begun to enter upon it: she is still a new country, and her greatness lies in the future, so that comparison with the mature nations of Western Europe is in fact misleading, and, in spite of the many obvious differences, the only fruitful analogies by which to judge her are to be found in that other New World opened up by European expansion in the opposite quarter. Russia and America have many features in common: in both the material environment dominates man's mind by the hugeness of its proportions, the interminable rivers, the unbroken plains, the lavishness of its resources and the inhospitableness of its desert places, and attempts to crush him by the monotony of its immensity in which his own puny life is engulfed. In both, again, man has reacted against nature, and used her own weapons to conquer her. The romance of the pioneer has been extraordinarily similar in the two continents. The Scandinavian adventurers who paddled up the rivers of the Baltic seaboard in the tenth century A.D., and discovered a portage which carried them down the Dniepr, in despite of its rapids, to the waters of the Black Sea, remind us of the French explorers who penetrated from the St. Lawrence estuary to the Gulf through the Great Lakes and the basin of the Mississippi; the expansion to the east, which reached the Pacific within a century of crossing the Urals, was likewise effected along the navigable rivers, which afforded water-passage for the whole distance, with only four breaks; the introduction of steam facilitated internal communications still more, and the Volga steamer was as characteristic a feature of nineteenth-century Russia as the Mississippi steamer was, during the same period, of the United States[2]: finally, in Russia as in America, the railway came to supersede the river and annihilate distance altogether; the trans-Siberian line is the spinal cord along which the north-eastern colonies are strung, and is destined to play the same part towards them as the Canadian Pacific towards the western territories of our own American Dominion, while often, as in America, the railway leads the van and actually precedes the settler; for example, the line which traverses the zone of steppes

[2] Mark Twain was a pilot on a Mississippi steamer, and Maxim Gorky began life as a cabin-boy in a steamer on the Volga!

between Orenburg and Tashkent, to link the fertile lands of European Russia north-west of the Ural river with the fertile territory of Ferghana in the upper basin of the Syr Darya. The Russian, then, like the American, has succeeded in taming his country and compelling it to yield him up its riches: but his triumph is ultimately due not so much to the geographical assets we have described, as to his own character: for in the Russian, as in the peoples of English origin across the Atlantic, environment has evoked an extraordinary national vitality. The weakly Finnish forest-tribes of the north, and the more vigorous but also more scanty nomad population of the steppe, were no harder to supplant or absorb than the Red Indians – Tolstoy's tale of the peasant who kept moving eastward to take up larger allotments, and of his disastrous bargain with the Bashkirs, could easily be translated into an American setting; but the greatest victory of Russian nationalism has been the Russianization in sentiment and social intercourse of the Kazan Tatars who, when they were conquered in the sixteenth century, had a civilization of their own as vigorous as the conqueror's: this is perhaps the only living instance of the fusion on equal terms of Christian and Moslem in the same community and has more significance than the assimilation of Germans and Scandinavians by the United States, or even of the more heterogeneous South European elements that have lately reinforced the stream of migration across the Atlantic. Nor does the analogy end here: the discovery of a new world has not merely stimulated in the Russian a sub-conscious response to the enviroment's call: it has awakened in him, as in the American, an active and personal religious emotion with a tendency to vent itself in extravagant forms. Russia is a hotbed of new sects, and those which have not found honour in their own country have often found freedom in the wilderness, and made smooth the way for their countrymen who had cast them out: the semi-theocratic communities of Cossacks, half monks and half marauders, who flung back the Tatars beyond the Dniepr and the Don, the Terek and the Ural, and opened the path for the Russian merchant and cultivator to the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas, are the exact counterparts of that Mormon Church which secured for the United States the inheritance of a Pacific slope beyond the great prairies. Russia is a world of her own in the fullest sense: the material conquest of a peculiar environment had kindled in her an individual spiritual experience, and this has not, as has been so far the case with the parallel development of American nationality, confined itself

to manifestations of religious emotion, but has sought expression during the last century in a literature which is one of the greatest artistic creations of the human race. But here our German will interrupt us: «So you tell us», he will cry, «that the face of Russia is turned eastward away from Europe, as the face of America is turned towards the West, and that she, like the latter, is a world unto herself? I answer you then: "By their fruits ye shall know them". America invented the Monroe Doctrine and has abided by it: Russia is now engaged in a death-grapple with the nations of Central Europe». There is undoubtedly a truth underlying this argument. In the modern world no nation is self-sufficient, however broad its lands and independent its culture. America herself is at once sundered from and linked to Western Europe by the ideal intermediary of the Atlantic highways. Russia is less fortunate: instead of facing Europe across an ocean, she adjoins her back to back and is stifled by the closeness of the contact. Communication is only possible through two posterns, one opening upon the Black Sea and the other upon the Baltic, which served Russia originally for the introduction of those elements out of which she has built her civilization. The religious culture of Orthodox Christianity came up the estuary of the Dniepr, now commanded by the port of Odessa, and met at Kieff the political organization of those Scandinavian wanderers who had crossed the Baltic and penetrated the continent from the head of the Gulf of Finland, at the point where St. Petersburg was founded eight centuries later to be the door for that other Teutonic influence from Germany which endowed Russia with her modern bureaucracy. Now, however, that the Russian nation has found itself, these posterns have taken on a new significance: they are channels no longer of ingress for spiritual stimuli from without, but have become channels of egress for the economic surplus of the vast hinterland within. Russia can only export her timber through the Baltic and her grain and petroleum through the Black Sea: but both these sea-ways are landlocked, and the narrow passages by which they communicate with the open ocean are in either case controlled strategically by alien Powers, so that the aggressive Government at Berlin and the irresponsible Government at Constantinople can at any moment cut the lines of Russia's commerce and paralyze her economic life. This is an intolerable situation for Russia, and the necessity for liberating both the Black Sea and the Baltic is the vital interest that has involved her in the present struggle. She is not fighting to extend her territory towards the west: the vast empty spaces she

already possesses in the opposite quarter, which it will take her generations to fill up, make her no less proof than the United States against territorial ambitions: she is fighting to secure the right of way between her existing territories and the highways of the world, because the prosperity of the one depends more and more upon access to the other.

This pressing need is the key to her foreign policy during the last two centuries, and the persistent obstruction she has met in her efforts to satisfy it accounts for the alarm she has inspired in her obstructors. If you refuse to meet people's just claims by peaceful agreement, you will drive them to seize by force, and, in your despite, not only their just due but as much as they can get besides. If Turkey and Sweden have long trembled for their independence, and if Germany has lately been infected by the same panic, the cause of tension is to be found, not in any Russian initiative fatal to their interests, but in their own deliberate opposition to a Russian aim which could easily have been satisfied without their detriment[3]. The establishment of such rights of way for Russia must be one of the principal objects of the settlement that will follow this war, because their denial is a constant danger to the peace of Europe. A precedent will be found in the statesmanlike terms granted by Japan in the Treaty of Portsmouth, whereby she left Russia an adequate outlet on the Pacific even after she had inflicted on her a crushing defeat; and in the not distant future we ourselves shall have to facilitate a free transit across Persia for the great Russian hinterland in Central Asia, if we are to avoid a struggle with Russia at once as futile and as fearful as that in which Germany is now engaged.

Russia's interests, then, towards the west and south are essentially negative, and not such as to entice her into an active conspiracy with all the Slav elements in these quarters for the forcible subjection of Western Europe, a policy which would distract her from her true interests in the east, and derange altogether her political balance. But indeed Russia's relations with her immediate Slavonic neighbours have been persistently the reverse of anything that would suggest political co-operation, or even mutual understanding. The even

[3] We directly thwarted Russia's need for an outlet, in order to safeguard our route through the Mediterranean, which would only have been indirectly menaced by Russia's satisfaction: the result of Beaconsfield's policy in 1878 is the intervention of Turkey in this war on Germany's side.

tenor of Russia's expansion has been broken by one great check, the invasion[4] and domination of the Tatars, which retarded her development by at least two centuries, and this opened the way for two other Slavonic nationalities to assert themselves in the hour of her prostration.

II. The Ruthenes or "Little Russians" are the first of these groups, and they owe their individuality to the political disruption of Russia herself which was the consequence of the national catastrophe. While the germ of a new national State was maturing under the Tatar yoke at Moscow in the north-east, the Russians of the south-west, including the population round Kieff, the earliest centre of Russian life, were incorporated politically in certain States lying to the west of them, and were thereby subjected to modifications of dialect, religion, and culture which in time induced in them a national consciousness independent of the Muscovites'. The tendency is seen at its strongest in the section of them included within the Galician frontier who till the present war have never been reunited with the national Russian State, and have become so far westernized as to acknowledge the authority of the Pope[5]. But even in Galicia the differentiation of the Ruthenes from their brethren of Moscow is really superficial. Though they have given allegiance to Rome, they have clung to the Orthodox tradition in their ecclesiastical ritual and discipline, and with the best will in the world it is impossible to regard their speech as anything more than a Russian dialect, especially as it has become the vehicle of no literature which can in any way compare with the works of art enshrined in the Moscow dialect during the last century. Their numbers are indeed considerable, and the territory occupied by them extensive; but they are separated from the other Russians by no natural frontier, and the larger the proportion they bear to the whole Russian race[6], the more difficult it would be to secure them a separate political existence without breaking up once more the whole structure of the national Russian State. Now that all the Ruthenes will be brought within the bounds of the Russian Empire, their final

[4] In the thirteenth century A.D.
[5] They are technically known as Uniates.
[6] Apparently about 25,000,000 out of 85,000,000, i.e. a proportion of, roughly, 2 to 5.

redintegration with the main mass of the Russian nation is inevitable. The Germans may look forward to such an event as a sinister and unnatural conspiracy against themselves; but it is in reality no more than a readjustment of Russia's internal structure necessitated by objective facts of history and geography, and it would have been effected far sooner, had not the craze for compulsory, mechanical uniformity, traditional in the Petersburg bureaucracy which has so far directed Russian policy, broken out in a system of official repression which has galvanized "Little Russian" particularism into feverish life.

III. The two sections of the Russian race, then, so far from displaying a designing unanimity, have rather suffered from an unnatural feud: and the other nationality that profited by the Tatar episode at the expense of Russian unity, namely the Poles, actually stood to the Muscovite for the typical foreigner and the national enemy till the German deliberately took that part upon himself. Polish history has many parallels with that of Ireland: both countries have been backward in their development because they lay on the outskirts of western civilization, and both have been isolated by conservative adherence to the Roman Church, while their stronger and more cultured neighbours who lay between them and the chief centres of European life, adopted the reformed religion. Isolation and backwardness have in each case led to political subjection; but while the Irish were crushed before they had a chance of building up a national State, the partition of Poland in the last generation of the eighteenth century was primarily brought about by the political incapacity of the Poles themselves, revealed by centuries of unchallenged misgovernment not merely at home but at the expense of large alien populations[7]. The history of Polish nationality really begins with this supreme misfortune. The anarchy of the eighteenth century has been atoned for by the magnificent struggle for liberty in the nineteenth. Economics have come to the aid of the national cause, for Poland contains rich seams of coal and mineral ores, which have enabled her to play a prominent part in that industrial development of Western Europe which the same century has witnessed. Industry has brought wealth, populousness, and education, and thereby gone far to raise Poland to an equality with the nations which formerly outstripped

[7] Of whom the Ruthenes constituted the largest element.

her; but at the same time it has linked her to her secular enemy Russia by ties of economic interdependence, for the raw products of the one country and the manufacturing capacity of the other are complementary to one another: the Russian wheat zones, timber forests, and stock-breeding steppes are an ideal hinterland for an industrial country, and Poland is the first in the field, because she is in the most favourable position geographically, and because half her territory has actually been included for a century within the frontier and the tariff wall of the Russian Empire. It has accordingly become Poland's interest to forget the past, and reconcile herself with the Russian victor; but before the events of the present war national chauvinism on both sides had entirely baulked this natural and desirable development. The Poles, obsessed by the political injustice under which they suffered, were nationalists before all things, and saw in the revival which the nation had experienced through an economic chance, not the evidence of a changed situation, but a new weapon for the conduct of the old struggle; while the Russian bureaucracy found in victory no incentive for generosity, but kept alive on its side the memory of the past by a system of repression more brutal than that adopted towards the "Little Russians" in proportion to the far more violent recalcitrance of the Poles.

If a Panslav world-empire was Russia's political goal, she was at any rate her own worst enemy in thwarting its realization. All the living factor of geographical grouping and economic development were working to obliterate the historical dissension between Poles, Ruthenes, and Muscovites, and at least to produce among them a negative reconciliation, if not a co-operation of a positive kind: but Russian policy deliberately perpetuated the national hatred between these three closely related Slavonic groups, by using a past victory to impose a régime of aggravated political injustice upon the vanquished. This unfortunate situation was both a patent refutation of the Panslav bogy and at the same time a trump card ready to the hand of any one who still feared the spectre's visitations and wished to lay it once and for all. Austrian statesmanship was clever enough to seize the opportunity: the Hapsburg complexus obviously could not adapt itself to the "One nationality, one State" principle which during the last century has triumphed in Europe; but it could find a new watchword of its one in the mission of transcending national particularism and reconciling

different nationalities or fragments of nationalities to harmonious co-operation in the same political organism. The "Dual Monarchy" has, on the whole, disastrously failed to act up to this ideal, and has succumbed instead, as its very name proclaims, to that sinister perversion of Nationalism which expresses itself in the oppression of weaker races by a combination of the stronger. But its one brilliant success in the last generation has been the simultaneous conciliation of Polish and Ruthene nationalism in the province of Galicia. The difficult feat of driving these mutually antagonistic populations in double harness was, of course, facilitated by their common hatred of the Muscovite, and the conduct of the Petersburg Government provided a foil against which the most tentative advances on the part of Vienna were thrown into striking relief. But the fact remains that Austria succeeded in winning the loyalty of these two fragments of nations, and in identifying with her own ambitions the hopes of a large section among the kindred majorities across the Russian frontier. When the Russian armies recently occupied Galicia by force of arms, the Ruthenes received them with passive hostility, while the Poles rose *en masse* in the Austrian cause, organized volunteer bands which fought side by side with Francis Joseph's regular forces, and have actually marched as invaders with the Austro-German armies into the territory of their Polish brothers within the Russian Empire.

The tendency, then, at work in the peaceful sphere of economics to consolidate Poland and Russia into a single unit were first frustrated by the survival of national hatred, and then entirely scotched by Austria's diplomatic exploitation of the feud. Only some miracle of psychological conversion in the hearts of the Russian and Polish nations could enable the unifying forces to become operative: and this miracle has actually been accomplished by Germany, Austria's own ally. Since the first partition of Poland, Prussia has never changed her fundamental policy towards the Poles who have fallen within her frontier, though she has entirely reversed her policy towards the other Powers whom the Polish question concerns. Until the latter years of the nineteenth century, she succeeded in preserving the firm friendship of Russia by the common bond of concerted repression in the Polish provinces of the two Governments; that is, she followed Austria in playing off Poles and Russians against one another, though she backed the opposite party because Austria was then her rival. But when, after the foundation of the Empire, Germany negotiated the Triple

Alliance, and, by joining hands with Austria for a common policy of expansion towards the south-east, inevitably sacrificed her *entente* with Russia, so far from modifying her treatment of the Poles she only aggravated it still more. Formerly she had competed with Russia in harshness towards the Poles to secure Russia's good-will: now, in the moment of estrangement, she actually chose to surpass her, and to attract to herself the chief bitterness of Polish nationalism. Germany committed this folly because she was already in the grip of the Panslav nightmare. She no longer saw Pole and Russian as they were: she looked at them with the superficial glance of nervous antipathy, and in the language and character of both she only beheld Slavdom writ large: then, from common national character she inferred common national ambition, and girded herself to the task of battling with both at once. Even at this stage common sense might have suggested second thoughts. Granting that the growth of a common national consciousness between Poles and Russians was certain, the direction in which that consciousness would express itself must surely depend on the underlying traits of similarity on which it was based, and the blend of brutishness and flightiness which was the German caricature of the Slav would not suggest a propensity for far-reaching political combinations; or even supposing, again, that the common factor were an aggressive temper, similarity of this sort has evoked discord more often than union, and the tragic relations of Poland and Russia, which had been the determining factor of German policy till now, could have been interpreted most obviously as an instance of this generalization. But the German nation was no longer open to reason on this subject. Even when they closed with Russia in the present struggle, they might have kept Polish nationalism neutral, since they had Austria, the Poles' patron, marching under their banner; they could not instantaneously reverse the treatment of their own Poles, but they could follow Austria's lead in conciliating the majority of the nation subject to Russia. As soon, however, as they crossed the frontier, madness seized them: in the Russian Poles they saw, not a nation to be liberated, but a nest of Slavs to be crushed, and […] with the frontier town of Kalisz, they treated Poland as they had treated Belgium. The result has been a violent reversal in the relations of Poles and Russians, which, by erasing the memories of the past in the shock of a common struggle for existence, will probably open the door to a permanent reconciliation. If the Allies win this war, the liberation of the Poles in Prussia will have been

the joint achievement of the Poles in Russia and their Russian fellow citizens fighting shoulder to shoulder; and when once these two sections of the nation are united in an autonomous State within the Russian Empire, the remaining fragment in Galicia will be irresistibly attracted by nationalism and economic interest to join the larger mass. Poland re-arisen from the dead will hail Germany as her foundress with the same irony with which Germany traces her present unity to Napoleon. She will also have to thank Germany for the good understanding with Russia which was the essential condition of her restoration. This understanding will certainly take the form of political federation. But if ever the consciousness of strength deludes Russia and Poland into an aggressive movement against the west, the fault will be Germany's, for the example and the stimulus will have been derived from her.

IV. The solution of national problems in Galicia, which pointed the way to a better future for the Hapsburg monarchy, has unhappily remained an isolated incident; the sinister interests of the Magyar-German coalition have prevented its being followed up elsewhere, and the alienation of the Tchechs in Bohemia offers a melancholy contrast to the conciliation of the Galician Poles. The Tchech question was more easily capable of settlement than any other in the Empire. The whole nation[8] is contained within the Hapsburg frontiers, so that its organization as a united autonomous State involves no complications with other Powers concerning kindred fragments across the border; and it could only realize its national life within the framework of a wider grouping such as the Hapsburg Empire actually provides because, in the first place, it is surrounded by the Germans on three sides, and interlaced with them in such a patchwork of racial enclaves, that no military frontier or tariff wall could be drawn so as to sift out satisfactorily the two nationalities; while, secondly, even if such a boundary could be devised, the nominally liberated Tchechs would find themselves isolated in the midst of hostile nations in control of all those railways connexions with the distant

[8] There are 5,955,000 Tchechs in the Austrian crown-lands; even if we add to them the 1,968,000 Slovaks of Hungary, a population which share their dialect only, while its geographical orientation and political consciousness are distinct, we cannot reckon them at as much as 8,000,000.

ports of Hamburg and Trieste upon which the industrial prosperity of the country depends. There are geographical and economic factors, then, which conclusively assign the Thcechs to whatever political unit the future may establish in Central Europe, and which definitely link them with the German group, however much their native Slav temperament may disincline them to such company. But their national development has not failed to respond to its environment. The raw human material poured into Bohemia by the Slav migrations of the seventh century A.D. may have been scarcely distinguishable from the primitive stuff of Pole or Russian; but during all the centuries that have intervened since then it has reacted vigorously to totally different stimuli. Respited by its mountains from the German backwash, it preserved its existence by assimilating, like the Germans, the culture of Latin Christianity. The first university of Central Europe was founded at Prag in 1348 by a King of Bohemia who was also Holy Roman Emperor [...] education brought contact with the great world, and the idea of Wyclif, disseminated by wandering English scholars inspired a new prophet of European importance, John Hus.

The Tchech, then, has a strongly characterized national history which draws him westward and has less in common than any other Slav with the world of Russia; but he has never identified himself with the Austrian State of which he has been nearly three centuries a member, as the Welshman has merged himself in Great Britain or the Breton in France, and it was actually in Bohemia that Panslavism, the proposition that the common origin of Tchech and Russian has a political significance for the future, was formulated first. What induced the Tchech to adopt as his political objective a programme which neither had nor has any chance of realization, and which runs entirely counter to his economic interests and his national traditions? Not the hope of taking his place one day in a new Panslav nation that should be dominant in Europe, but the desperate fear of immediate destruction at the hands of already dominant Pangermanism. A glance at the racial map displaying how the German tentacles surround the Tchechs on north and south, and almost close behind him on the east, and the most cursory survey of the language controversy in Bohemia from 1848 to the present day, will leave no doubt as to which nation is the aggressor and which is on the defence: the Tchech schooled himself to the idea of subordinating his national life to the alien culture of Russia because the need for self-preservation outweighed all other considerations.

V. The Hapsburg monarchy has been prevented by German nationalism from solving the Tchech problem; but it has not failed without a struggle. The Slav element is so strong numerically in the whole Empire, and especially in the "Austrian" section of it[9], that a considerable party among the Tchechs has believed that it must ultimately, with the spread of education through itself and liberalism among its oppressors, obtain by a peaceful evolution the recognition that is its due, They conceive the Monarchy of the future as the common focus of many national cultures and as the political exponent of a Slavdom which should indeed unite in spirit all branches of the Slav race, but should find its rallying point in Prag, Cracow, and Agram, not in Moscow, Tiflis, and Irkutsk. This movement met with the sympathy from the dynasty itself; the electoral law of 1906, which made a serious attempt to introduce a really proportional representation of the nationalities in the Reichsrat at Vienna, seemed an earnest of more to come; and the heir to the throne assassinated last June was credited with the intention of shelving "Dualism" and establishing "Trialism" in its place.

Had the Tchechs, Poles, and Ruthenes been the only populations involved, the idea might at least have been translated into experiment. But Trialism had also to reckon with the far more critical question of the Southern Slavs, and on that reef the Hapsburg monarchy has finally foundered, after weathering so many storms and sighting what might have proved a permanent haven. The vicissitudes of the Southern Slavs are an epitome of all Slav history. In the great migration of the seventh century A.D. they split off from their Tchechs and Polish cousins, crossed the Carpathians and the Danube, and drifted down upon the mountain zone that separates the Danube basin from the east coast of the Adriatic, from Agram in the north-west to Skoplye in the south-east[10]. Arriving here in the impressionable state of primitive Slavdom, they were exposed to strong cultural influences from all directions at close

[9]

	Total population	*Slav element*	*Slav percentage*
"Austria"	25,619,000	15,493,000	60
Hungary	20, 933,000	5,429,000	25
Bosnia.	1, 898,000	1,898,000	100

[10] They exterminated or absorbed the original Illyrian population, already decimated by the Goths, except in the south-west corner, where they have survived as the Albanians.

quarters. The Catholic faith penetrated them from German Salzburg and Italian Aquileia: Orthodox Christianity pushed its way up the valleys of the Vardar and the Danube; and in the fifteenth century the Paulicians heretics of Bosnia, who had been persecuted by their Christians neighbours of all sects, adopted from the Turks the victorious creed of Islam. German and Magyar closed in upon the Southern Slavs' rear, and isolated them from their Slavonic kinsmen in the north; and in their weakness they fell under foreign dominion, and became the battle ground, first of Magyars and Venetians, and subsequently of all Western Europe against the Islamic East united under Ottoman leadership. At this stage the Hapsburg dynasty first came into contact with the Southern Slav race. After the Hungarian *débâcle* at Mohcás in 1526, the estates of Croatia, like the Hungarians themselves, called in the House of Austria to defend them from the Turkish advance, and from that time onwards large sections of Southern Slav population have remained continuously under their rule. Hapsburg government has never been offered a more favourable field. The Southern Slav race as a whole, though all its members spoke a practically homogeneous language, possessed no common national consciousness whatsoever. Lying on the borderland of west and east, it took after the east in finding the determining factor in religion. The Catholic Croat, the Orthodox Serb[11], the Moslam Bosniak were divided not merely by dogma and ritual, but by the three different scripts, Latin, Cyrillic, and Arabic, with which their three religions had provided them for the respective expression of their identical tongue, and by the rival cultures and traditions with which creed and script had severally linked them. They entirely lacked the bond of a glorious national past, which in the nineteenth century inspired and united all Poles, a to a much greater degree all Italians, to work together for national unity in the future. Probably, however, it was inevitable that the national movement should affect them in the end. The spread of education and the growth of literature would naturally heighten the consciousness of the linguistic factor at the expense of the religious, and prepare the way for the union of Croat, Bosniak, and Serb. But the Hapsburg monarchy might have found a golden opportunity in such a development. Italy, with a population that to-day

[11] Croat and Serb were originally the names of two Southern Slav tribes lying to the north-west and sputh-east respectively; but they have come to stand for all Catholics on the one hand, or Orthodox on the other, who speak the Southern Slav dialect.

almost totals 35,000,000, and with a configuration sharply bounded by physical barriers, was obviously destined, when once national unity was achieved, for complete political independence. Even the united Poland of the future, though too weak, with her 18,000,000, stand alone, will inevitably gravitate away from Vienna towards the world of Russia. But the Southern Slavs are a small nation:

adding all their fragments together, we cannot reckon them at much above 8,000,000 – at little more, that is, than the Tchechs or the Magyars[12]; like these two nationalities, they must always form part of a larger grouping, and the unit to which geography and economics assign them is precisely that represented at present by the Hapsburg Monarchy. Their mountainous country has only two outlets, one upon the Danube basin and the other upon the Adriatic; but the terminus of the coastal route is the port of Trieste at the head of the gulf, and the railways which connect Trieste with its European hinterland meet at Vienna the railways from Belgrade and Agram, which link the Southern Slavs with Europe upon their other flank. The national unity, then, of the Southern Slavs would naturally have been achieved under the sovereignty of the Hapsburgs, and the dynasty bade fair to carry out this mission. In spite of preoccupations in the west, they rolled back the Turkish tide in a series of magnificent campaigns between 1683 and 1718, before Russia entered the lists at all. The final settlement of 1739 left within the Austrian frontier the most prosperous and civilized portions of the Southern Slav race, including the majority of the Croats and an important minority of Serbs. The latter were mostly refugees from the territory still held by the Turks, and Austria, by giving them shelter, acquired a patronage over the Orthodox as well as the Catholic division of the race, and in fact over the Balkan Christian in general who were still subject to Turkish dominion, so that, when the Serbs south of the Save rose against the Turks at the beginning of the last century, they looked for support to Vienna and not to Petersburg. But after 1815 the Hapsburgs adopted the fatal principle of opposing nationalism in all its manifestations, and when a series of disasters forced them to abandon this policy they substituted for it the still more fatal plan of governing their Empire through a Magyar-German coalition, founded on the oppression of a heterogeneous alien majority. The anti-

[12] Official statistics both of Southern Slavs and Magyars are apt to exaggerate.

national policy in which Vienna persisted from 1815 to 1867 cost her the hegemony of the Balkans. Rebuffed by Metternich, the Serbs bethought them that Russia was linked with them by the ties of common Slavdom and Orthodoxy, and might be induced by such considerations to put forth her immense strength in their favour; while Russia on her part was willing to give rein to her sentiment, because every blow struck at Turkish power in Europe brought her one stage nearer to unlocking the gate of the Black Sea straits. The Serbian national State was brought into existence by the Russo-Turkish wars of 1828 and 1878. The dual system in force since 1867 has cost the Hapsburg monarchy the bitter hostility of the whole Southern Slav race, within her borders as well as without and has ended in a catastrophe which will probably involve her disruption.

The "Compromise" of 1867 between Vienna and Buda-Pest put the Magyars in a position to control the Empire's eastern policy at the moment when the closing of Germany against Austrian ambitions made compensatory expansion in the Balkans supremely important for the monarchy's future. Now more than ever it was essential to induce the whole Southern Slav race to enter of its own free will the Hapsburg fold. But this very race was regarded by the triumphant Magyars with the bitterest hostility. Magyars statesmen felt that the future of their newly liberated nation depended on free access to the Adriatic coast, and the solid mass of the Southern Slavs entirely intervened between Magyardom and the sea. The problem might easily have been solved by an economic entente between an autonomous Hungary and an autonomous "Yugoslavia"[13] federated within a common Hapsburg frontier; for we have seen that a free passage through the Danube-plains inhabited by the Magyars was, and is, at least as vital to the Southern Slavs as a right of way to the Adriatic is to the Magyars. But instead of taking care to conciliate the various elements of the Southern Slav race, so that when the coming nationality "found itself" it should start its career on friendly terms with Hungary and be ready to adjust its economic relations with the latter in a co-operative spirit, the Magyars determined so to crush these racial fragments that the unborn nationality should never assert itself. Such a policy was probably shortsighted and certainly criminal, but in view of the acute division between Croat, Serb, and Bosniak it had some

[13] "South-Slavdom".

prospect of success: the Magyar intriguers had only to play off one section of the race against another. But like the Germans, they have sacrificed prudence to rancour: they have tried to smite the hated hydra on all his heads at once, and have capped the German miracle of Polo-Russian reconciliation by the still more amazing *tour de force* of uniting Croat and Serb .

Croatia was handed over to the tender mercies of the Magyars by the "Compromise". The country is especially significant to the Magyars because it is traversed by the railway that connects Buda-Pest with the port of Fiume; and though, by a separate compromise of their own, they granted it nominal home-rule, the Ban or viceroy, an official appointed by the Hungarian Cabinet, has generally managed to pack the local Croatian Diet with tools of the Buda-Pest government, and when he has failed, the interval has been tided over by the suspension of constitutionalism and recourse to martial law. The Magyars have used this corrupt control over Croatia to exploit the country in their own economic interests, and have earned the lasting hatred of the Croats as much by the methods employed as by the result achieved. Meanwhile the Magyars took the first opportunity to strike at the Serbs also. In 1876 the whole Catholic and Orthodox population of Bosnia, the Turkish province wedged in between Croatia and the free Serbian principality, broke into revolt. They were all Southern Slavs, and their distress provoked the intervention first of Serbia and then of Russia on Serbia's behalf. But Russia finally prostrated Turkey so completely in the war of 1877-8, that she roused against herself a panic-stricken coalition of European statesmen, headed by Disraeli, and in the course of their revision of Russia's terms to Turkey, the Dual Monarchy secured a mandate to occupy Bosnia as a set-off to Russian influence in the Balkans. Serbia had staked her existence to liberate her brethren in Bosnia, but now she saw them severed from herself far more irrevocably than before, and was compelled to watch the new Austrian régime just across her frontier systematically promoting the Catholic and Moslem elements in the province and repressing the Serb. Thus the first stage in the Monarchy's march towards the Aegean was accomplished. But Magyars statesmanship[14] had decided that it should proceed over the Southern Slav's dead body, instead of enlisting him under its advancing

[14] The Magyar Count Andrássy was the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs who effected the coup.

banner. Already Austrian garrisons were established in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, thrust like a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro, the other independent Southern Slav State on the seabord, while on Serbia's further flank Austrian diplomacy was weaving a protectorate over the Albanians, the Southern Slavs' most deadly racial rivals. No wonder that the Serb race drew closer to Russia than ever, and grew to hate the Dual Monarchy as deeply as the Croats hated the Magyars.

The gathering storm of feeling was bound to vent itself in action, and in 1905 two events occurred of capital importance. The Hapsburg monarchy made an unsuccessful attempt to bring Serbia to heel by the "Pig war", imposing a prohibitive tariff on Serbian exports, which was intended to demonstrate to Serbia that her economic outlets were in her neighbour's grip, but which only determined her to win new outlets free from Austrian control. Serbian nationalism emerged from this struggle militant. Simultaneously, the leading Serb and Croat politicians within the Monarchy itself held a conference in Dalmatia, and published two resolutions proclaiming the common needs and dangers of the two branches of the race, and their own intention of working together for the future in local Diets of Croatia and Dalmatia, and in the general Parliaments of Buda-Pest and Vienna, towards the realization of common national objects. The combined effect of these incidents upon the Magyars was profound: the spectre of Panslavism suddenly rose before them, and from this moment the plot thickened. They made up their minds that their only remaining chance of success lay in a vigorous offensive, and they determined to crush the Serbs, who were now the focus of the danger, upon the first opportunity that offered.

In 1908 the whole question of the Near East was re-opened by the Young Turk revolution, and the Hapsburg Government at once took action. First they made a desperate attempt to break the Serbo-Croat coalition by creating the scare of a Panserb conspiracy against the integrity of the Monarchy. About thirty obscure and innocent Hungarian subjects of Serb race were arrested in the summer of 1908 on a charge of high treason; but the protracted trial at Agram, which followed their still more protracted imprisonment, made Hungarian politics notorious throughout Europe, only to end in a fiasco. The prosecution did not succeed in implicating any of the Serb-Croat leaders, and the libel action brought next year

by a number of them against Dr. Friedjung, an eminent Austrian historian, proved that the documents upon which he had based more concrete charges against them in the pages of a newspaper and which he had accepted in all good faith from the Joint Foreing Office, were forgeries prepared by the Austro-Hungarian legation at Belgrade. The effect of this scandal was to sap, instead of fortifying, the loyalty of the Croat to the Monarchy, and to foster his new-born sympathy with the Serb; for a few weeks after the arrest of the Agram victims, and long before the trial was opened, there had come a *dénouement* which revealed the whole intention of the Government's scheme, the formal annexation of Bosnia. This was intended as a *coup de grâce* to the hopes of Serbian nationalism, which had lingered on in spite of the mortal wound inflicted by "occupation" in 1878. Serbia felt that the supreme hour had come; she appealed to Russia for intervention, and the Dual Monarchy found itself on the verge of a death-struggle with her huge Slav neighbour on the north over the fate of the little Slav race on her southern flank, when Germany at the crucial moment ranged herself in shining armour by the side of her ally, and Russia drew back, with the indignant determination in her heart to be ready next time for any eventuality. The crisis which the Joint Foreign Minister, Count Aerenthal, precipitated in 1908 had thus finally weld the bonds between the Croats and the Serbs on the one hand, and the Southern Slavs and Russians on the other. The Southern Slav problem had formerly affected Russia merely in her remoter interest and more subconscious sentiments: Magyar infatuation had transformed it into the burning question of Russian national policy.

The catastrophe was close at hand: Serbia's successive triumphs over Turkey and Bulgaria in the two Balkan Wars[15] almost doubled her own territory and population, and fused the passive sympathy of the Croats into an active enthusiasm. This glorious year of Serbia's history reversed the relations between the two branches of the race, and decided that the imminent realization of Southern Slav nationality should be achieved by Serbian initiative outside the Hapsburg Monarchy, instead of by Croat initiative within it. The Turk was driven beyond the horizon, and the Magyar remained as the one supreme enemy of the whole nation.

[15] October, 1912; July, 1913.

VI. One further variety of Slav people claims our attention before we close our inquiry and draw our conclusions. When, during the seventh century A.D., the Southern Slavs occupied the Adriatic coast in force, their vanguard spread out fanwise and penetrated to the extremity of Greece and to the coasts of the Black Sea. In the south their flying columns were soon assimilated by the native population[16]; but in the interior of the Balkan peninsula, a vague rectangle bounded by the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Aegean, the Bulgars, a little horde of nomads who entered the country simultaneously from the Black Sea steppes, played the same part towards the Slavs that the Scandinavian adventurers performed on the Dnieper, and organized them into a national state vital enough to preserve its Slavonic identity and absorb, instead of being absorbed by, the aboriginal inhabitants. Thus a new Slav nation was formed, differing markedly in dialect[17], and still more emphatically in national consciousness, from their Southern-Slav kinsmen to the north-west. Believers in Panslavism, its apostles and denunciators alike, are inclined to maintain that the modern Bulgar is not really a Slav, because the national Bulgarian point of view does not at all fit in with their own theory. This is of course as absurd as to treat the Russian as a Scandinavian or a Finn, and the Pole as a Lithuanian; but the recent history of Bulgaria will explain the motive of the plea.

From the Turkish conquest down to 1878, the Bulgarian race was entirely eclipsed. It had no great ballad literature like that which kept the Serbs in mind of their past; still less had it any living culture, for its ecclesiastical subordination to the Greek patriarchate of Constantinople, from which it had only just begun to emancipate itself, had drawn it entirely

[16] The predominantly Slavonic geographical nomenclature of modern Greece still testifies to the Slav immigration.

[17] Bulgarian differs from South-Slavonic chiefly in being far less archaic: it has lost many primitive Slavonic inflexions which South-Slavonic retains; this is because the modern Bulgar contains a much stronger alloy of assimilated native population than the Souther Slav, who occupied his country in much greater force than the advance-guard: the fact that the substratum of the Souther Slavs was Illyrian, while that of the Slavs of Bulgarian was Thracian, doubtless account for further differentiation; but the dialect of the modern Bulgar can have been little affected by the admixture of the non-Slavonic ruling caste from whom he derives his name.

into the orbit of Greek civilization, and any Bulgar peasant who struggled to eminence up the ecclesiastical ladder was automatically Hellenized in the process. After her victory over the Turks in 1878, Russia recalled the Bulgarian nation into political existence. The appeal of the Slavs oppressed by Turkey had stimulated a strong sense of Panslavism in the Russian nation; Russia calculated that gratitude and helplessness would combine to arouse the emotion still more strongly in the new Bulgarian principality; she confidently expected, and the rest of Europe uneasily feared, that this sentimental bond would permanently retain Bulgaria as her pliant tool. But to everybody's amazement, the newborn infant stood straightway upon his own feet, and proceeded, like Hermes, to steal his big brother's cattle. The Bulgars have worked systematically: first they deliberately emancipated themselves from Russia's control, and then they entirely upset Russia's policy in the Balkans by entering the lists against Serbia and Greece, Russia's earlier protégés, for the prize of the Turk's European inheritance. Instead of driving Serb and Bulgar to victory in double harness, the Panslav charioteer found himself in danger of losing the Balkan race altogether through the unseemly and embarrassing rivalry of his two steeds. When the crisis of the Young Turk revolution arrived in 1908, Bulgaria actually plotted the violation of the Berlin Treaty in concert with the Dual Monarchy, and repudiated Ottoman suzerainty at the same moment that Count Aerenthal announced the annexation of Bosnia; and the understanding with the Triple Alliance for which this incident opened the way, culminated after the triumph of the nation in the heroic struggle against Turkey. At the end of June 1913, Bulgaria, encouraged by the Central European Powers, treacherously attacked her recent allies, with the intention of seizing all the spoils for herself, and the disaster with which she met was equivalent to a diplomatic victory for her creator, Russia.

What is the explanation of Bulgaria's behaviour? It is not difficult to discover. The Bulgar is a nationalist first and a Panslav afterwards. During the wonderful generation of reconstruction through which he lived from his emancipation in 1878 to his declaration of war against Turkey in 1912, he was inspired by one aim only, the achievement of the united, the "Greater" Bulgaria, and he pursued it with a truly Prussian unscrupulousness and persistence. If Russia's dream of opening for herself the Black Sea straits hampered Bulgaria's advance, Russia must be flouted: if Serbia disputed the reversion of Bulgar lands in

Macedonia, including even Ohrida, the capital of the first Bulgarian Tsars, then Serbia was Bulgaria deadliest foe. Panslav theorists might call the Bulgarian nation by any names they liked, but the nation was determined to realize its destiny, and if the Teutonic powers were ready for a deal, it would realize it by the aid of the Teutonic Powers. This was the Bulgar's point of view: we may shake our heads over the ruthlessness with which he put it into action, but in the light of other relations between Slav and Slav which we have already examined, the standpoint itself will hardly surprise us.

At last we have completed our catalogue of the principal Slav nationalities: we have cast our eye in turn upon the Russian, pioneer and peasant, heretic and
novelist, absorbed in creating through the centuries a new world of his own; the Pole, with a tragic political past and his comfortable industrial future; the Tchech, caught up in the spiritual and economic evolution of Western Europe and deflected from the tradition of Cyril and Methodius[18] to the production of John Hus and the Moravian Brotherhood; the Southern Slav, struggling to extricate his nationality from his allegiance to three religions; the Bulgar, doggedly devoting himself to his national egotism. What conclusions are we to draw from this pageant of concentrated efforts and inevitable processes, of memories from the past and hopes for the future? One thing at least is clear. The Slav proves on closer inspection to be a more complex phenomenon than we should have inferred from the bold generalizations in which both his friends and his enemies are accustomed to take his name in vain. Like the Teuton he has been assiduously differentiating himself since his first appearance on the scene of history, and he will certainly continue to differentiate himself still further. On the other hand, we have seen good evidence for believing that in the case of the Slav this development has not proceeded so far as to deprive original unity of present significance. Not only can all the living varieties of his speech be regarded as dialects of a single language, but his German delineator has real grounds for investing him with certain typical features of group-character, even though he invariably distorts the portrait into a caricature, and bases on

[18] The Greek evangelizers of the Slavs.

these falsified traits a ludicrously improbable horoscope of his future. We carry away with us the impression that a movement does exist to which the name of Panslavism can be applied. In the Teutonic world the growth of group consciousness in all its manifestations, economic, political, spiritual, is obviously limited by the barrier between nationalities. The various springs of human culture which welled up in the British Isles have mingled in the stream of common British civilization, but they will never coalesce with the German river to form a mightier flood: the excellence of each will always lie in its own individual savour, never in the common Teutonic element out of which each is evolved. But the Slavonic torrents have not yet carved out for themselves unalterable channels: the freshet of self-realization is only now beginning to swell their volume, and some of its waves bid fair to overtop the banks of nationality, and send their ripples dancing through the whole race. We can see visions of a Panslav culture in the future, which shall be neither of Moscow nor of Prag, nor yet of Sofia nor of Tobolsk, but of the whole Slav world. And yet what is that but the world of Europe? In surveying the life of the various Slav nationalities we have been led to touch upon most of those problems and possibilities which are of European importance. Panslavism as a culture will be a phase in the common evolution of European society, rather than the idiosyncrasy of one racial faction within it.

Panslavism, then, in the spiritual sense is a real and a beneficient force; but our investigation has also convinced us that during the last generation it has been rapidly taking on a political significance as well: various Slavonic units have been falling out from the ranks to which custom and locality have assigned them, and ranging themselves in a new formidable battle array; even now the trumpet has sounded, and the hosts are locked in the grapple of war. Does the responsibility for this regrouping of parties and the terrible strife that has arisen from it, fall ultimately upon the Slavs? Our review of current Slav problems has fortunately enabled us to give a decisive answer to this question. Political Panslavism is the cry of the distressed for succour, not ambition's rallying call for the onset: it has not emanated from Russia's strength and arrogance, but from the weakness and oppression of the Tchech and the Southern Slav: Russia has

entered upon this war to right her Slavonic Brethren's wrongs, not to set her foot on the neck of her Teutonic enemies.

Supposing that the Allies win this war, that the wrongs are righted, and Europe reorganized on a truly national basis, what, we ask, will the future bring forth? Will the combination forced upon various Slav nationalities by the common danger to their existence dissolve again as soon as existence and well-being are secured them, and give place to a confederation of all Europe in which each nationality shall have its separate station? Or will the Slavs take the same path as the Germans, and be tempted by the success of their co-operation for defence to co-operate thereafter for aggression? At the present juncture no one can foretell, least of all the Slavs themselves. Tradition, economics, and geography are three mighty obstacles in the path of any policy of Panslavism conceived in this world-conquering vein. But should the most lurid prophecies of the Slav's worst enemies be verified, and Europe finally succumb to a Slav domination more appalling than that with which she is now threatened by the German, the ultimate responsibility for this catastrophe will still lie with those political necromancers in Germany who have already conjured reality out of a spectre.